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Abstract. Prices can be used as an effective tool for 
providing incentives for efficient water use. Under ideal 
conditions prices will reflect the true scarcity of water in a 
region and can then provide extraordinarily valuable 
information as to "efficient" patterns of intrastate and 
interstate water uses. Water markets can provide such prices. 
The strengths and weaknesses of water markets are reviewed 
in this paper. 
INTRODUCTION 
Over the last decade the notion of sustainable growth and 
development has become an increasingly topical issue for 
discussion and debate among scholars and policy makers. As 
we approach the new millennium, our interest in this notion 
is undoubtedly stimulated by a growing awareness of the 
degraded nature of natural and environmental resources that 
will be passed on to those who will populate that new 
millennium--our future generations. In the case of water 
resources, in terms of both quantity and quality, these 
concerns are made manifest in a number of ways. Examples 
of interest to this forum are tensions between states that arise 
from a growing awareness of limited water supplies in 
interstate streams, and efforts by affected states to protect 
their access to these vital resources to the end of promoting 
sustainable future economic development for their citizens. 
When interstate conflicts over shared water resources arise, 
notwithstanding the forum used in efforts to resolve them--the 
courts or negotiation processes--each state will have the 
burden of demonstrating its present and future needs for 
water within a very specific and well established legal 
context. This context is one wherein the state must make 
clear its efforts to wisely manage its water resources. The 
state has the burden of demonstrating by compelling evidence 
that its water use is efficient (Sherk, 1989). In more 
legalistic terms that are clearly consistent with our concerns 
for "sustainability," and drawing on the words of Justice 
Holmes (in New Jersey v._ New York, 283 U.S. 336, 1931 at 
342), it has the burden of demonstrating by compelling 
evidence that there is no waste of "the treasure of the river." 
Such evidence typically relies upon the state's comprehensive  
water plan and its legal and regulatory mandates for the 
conservation and reuse of water. 
Particularly compelling evidence of efficient water use can 
result from a state's reliance on what is typically thought of 
as a "Western" institution: water markets (Saliba, Bush, 
Martin and Brown, 1987). A number of writers, primarily 
legal scholars (Sherk, 1991), have noted the extent to which 
evolving water laws in the riparian Fast and the prior-
appropriation West appear to be converging. With the 
"regulated-riparian" system evolving in Eastern States, we 
then see the evolution of circumstances which could provide 
one of the basic requisites for an effective market institution: 
fungible water rights. While, unlike conditions extant in a 
prior appropriation system, a regulated-riparian system does 
not establish a system of property rights in water, its water 
use permits could indeed be accorded the status of a 
marketable usufructuary right All else equal, there can be 
little question as to the efficiency of water use in a system 
wherein water rights are allocated via markets. Of course, 
the fact of the matter is that "all else" is not equal. While 
there are indeed gains that can accrue to a state from reliance 
on water markets, there may also be many sources of 
potential costs. 
As I have reflected on the topic of central interest for this 
year's Georgia Water Resources Conference, and on the topic 
of interest for this particular panel, I thought that it might be 
timely to take up the question as to the extent to which some 
form of a water market might play a useful role in the 
Southeastern States. The relevance of this inquiry for our 
panel's discussion derives from the fact that a functioning 
water market can not be confined to a state's boundaries. 
The Supreme Court has made clear its position that water is 
an article in commerce, in which case any state law or 
regulation affecting water use that has the effect of 
discriminating against citizens of another state will be 
scrutinized under the provisions of the Commerce Clause of 
the U.S. Constitution (Johnson and DuMars, 1989). Thus, 
any water market is necessarily interstate, and the efficacy of 
such markets must be assessed accordingly. 
I must make clear that in raising this question, my intention 
is not to advocate the use of water markets. I am motivated 
to raise this question by my conviction that the interests of 
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state water planners are best served by their consideration of 
all possible tools that are available to them for their use in 
promoting efficient water use. I will then proceed by 
addressing a necessarily limited number of questions 
regarding the efficacy of water markets. My questions 
necessarily reflect my experience, and my experience with 
water planning has been in Western States. Thus, while the 
questions that I will raise are those that are of primary 
concern in the West, I cannot and do not claim that they are 
those that will be of most importance in this part of the 
country. Again, in raising these questions my intent is simply 
to provoke interest and discussion as to the potential 
tractability of shaping some form of a water market that 
might be useful in Southeastern States like Georgia. 
QUESTIONS REGARDING THE EFFICACY OF 
WATER MARKETS 
How Might Water Rights Be Established? 
It is typically the case that existing water use permits are 
considered as conferring some sort of a de facto usufructuary 
right to permit holders. For the functioning of a water 
market, state legislation would be required that provides for 
the transfer of permits among willing buyers and sellers. 
All is not quite so simple, however. The change in use of 
water can result in "externalities" or third-party effects; 
evolution of the "Public Trust Doctrine" related to Western 
water use is discussed below. The point that must be 
appreciated for our purposes is that water markets as we 
know them in the U.S. are not strictly bi-party transactions. 
There is a third party to any transaction who is charged with 
assessing the effects of the transaction on third parties, or 
more generally on "social welfare." In the West, this third 
party is the State Engineer; when water in federal projects is 
involved, there is a fourth party to a proposed transfer the 
Bureau of Reclamation. A proposed transfer of water rights 
must be approved by this fourth party. Any proposed sale is 
advertised in the newspapers, and a hearing is scheduled by 
the State Engineer. Any party that feels that its interests 
might be adversely affected by the transfer can present 
testimony regarding such effects at the hearing. This process, 
which requires the state's representative to weigh the asserted 
gains and losses to society associated with the proposed 
transfer, can become very complicated and, in some cases, 
very expensive. 
For existing or newly issued water use permits, the 
"quality" of such permits, and therefore such rights, may vary 
from one permit-holder to another, reflecting differences in 
such things as the number of years remaining before the 
permit must be renewed and legal/regulatory conditions on 
the permit (e.g., conditions requiring a conservation plan). 
Water rights traded in Western water markets also vary in 
"quality," reflecting differences in priority dates, dates at 
which rights were established via an individual putting water 
to beneficial use. Of course, prices for water rights will 
reflect differences in the "quality" of rights. 
Markets in Riparian States 
As mentioned above, water markets can not be confined to 
a state's boundaries. There are a number of other legal 
questions that would require consideration if one were to 
seriously contemplate the establishment of water markets in 
riparian states. I will simply mention a few of these (see 
Sherk, 1991). In instances where the sale of a usufructuary 
right involves a substantial change in the location of water 
withdrawals, would such changes affect the riparian rights of 
upstream or downstream users and would such affects be 
tolerated under riparian law? Changes in site of use would 
require particular scrutiny in terms of their possible effects on 
instream water uses mandated under federal law (e.g., the 
Endangered Species Act, the Clean Water Act, and the 
Coastal Zone Management Act). Related to the discussion 
above concerning "conditioned" water rights, it must be noted 
that virtually any water right is conditioned by the 
compatibility of its use with federal statutes. Under riparian 
law, what are the limits to a state's ability to "regulate" water 
use--would the establishment of water markets be viewed by 
the courts as an impermissible transfer or abrogation of a 
state's rights and responsibilities to regulate (particularly) 
interstate streams? 
Who Would Be The Likely Participants In 
A Water Market? 
Typically, the major buyers of water rights are 
municipalities and industrial entities. There are instances in 
the West where private environmental organizations have 
purchased substantial water rights for the purpose of 
preserving instream flows. Major suppliers of rights are 
typically found in the agricultural sector. 
This pattern of buyers and sellers can give rise to a number 
of problems, some of which are discussed below. I might 
point out here that requisites for a well-functioning market 
include "small" transactions costs and "many" buyers and 
sellers, conditions that are often violated in the West (Brajer, 
et al., 1989). In terms of transactions costs, earlier mention 
was made of the potential extraordinary litigation costs arising 
from the process of a state's approving a proposed water 
transfer. In terms of many buyers and sellers, Western water 
markets are often dominated by a single buyer--a large 
municipality--who can effectively fix prices. This is the case, 
for example, in the State of New Mexico's Middle Rio 
Grande Valley wherein the City of Albuquerque effectively 
fixes prices (for almost a decade, the City has pegged water 
prices at $1,000/acre foot). 
What Are The Externalities Associated With Market 
Transfers Of Water: How Can Society's Interests In 
Water Use Be Taken Into Account? 
Critics of water markets, and there are many, point to 
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weaknesses in such markets as they reflect considerations 
related to externalities and equity. For example, in most 
western states municipalities are exempt from the payment of 
property taxes imposed by counties. It has been argued that 
the market acquisition of rural water rights by municipalities 
can have the effect of deteriorating the tax base of rural 
county governments (Shupe, et al., 1989). As an example, a 
common practice (particularly in Colorado and Arizona) by 
which water rights are obtained by a municipality is its 
purchase of farmland which has water rights associated with 
it. This means of acquiring water rights removes lands on the 
county government's tax rolls, with the potential result of 
eroding its ability to maintain social infrastructure. 
As noted earlier, a great deal of opposition to the idea of 
allowing water rights to be transferred via markets derives 
from the wide range of potential externalities associated with 
the transfer of water rights, particularly in cases where the 
transfer results in a change in the location of use. Typical 
external effects relevant in these regards include effects on: 
fish and wildlife habitat; the protection of aquatic life; 
recreation; aesthetic beauty; navigation; water quality; access 
to public waters; and minimum instream flows. While some 
argue that such externalities might be taken into consideration 
in water markets via the careful construction of water rights 
and market institutions (Anderson, 1983), equity considera-
tions lead many to question the efficacy of water markets 
notwithstanding efficiency benefits which might derive from 
their use. Brown and Ingram (1986 at p. 15) argue that 
unfettered water markets will threaten both environmental 
quality and the rights of nonurban constituencies by ignoring 
the non-economic values of water; Mumme and Ingram 
(1989) see water markets as "..nothing less than a program 
for the redistribution of control over western water...toward 
those parties most able to purchase scarce water rights," and 
a number of scholars are particularly concerned with water 
markets as a source for increasing social conflicts (Folk-
Williams, Fry and Hilgendorf, 1985). 
Indeed, there is growing evidence that water law in 
Western States is becoming increasingly influenced by 
considerations related to equity or, more generally, to the idea 
that water has a communal value. The idea here is that water 
is so essential to western society that any transfer of water 
rights must be subject to close scrutiny by representatives of 
the general public for assessments of the potential impacts of 
the transfer on traditional cultural patterns of communities. 
A number of western states have institutionalized public 
interest provisions regarding water rights transfers in their 
water codes; the State of New Mexico was the first western 
state to do so, providing in 1907 that the State Engineer could 
disallow a water transfer "...if in his opinion the approval 
thereof would be contrary to the public interest" (Sec. 28, c. 
49 Laws, 1907) In the case of California, the state constitu-
tion was changed in 1928 to reflect public interests in water: 
"The general welfare requires...that the waste or unreasonable 
use...of water be prevented, and that the conservation of such 
water is to be exercised...in the interest of the people and the 
public welfare...." (California Constitution, Art. X, S.2). The 
court's acceptance of what has become known as the "public 
trust doctrine" as it relates to the public's interests in water 
rights transfers is seen in the 1985 Shokal v. Dunn decision 
(707 P.2d 441, Idaho, 1985). In this case the court accepted 
an extraordinarily broad view of the potential components of 
public interests; set out the provision that duty to protect the 
public interest "...is related to the larger doctrine of the public 
trust" (at 447-8, footnote 2); and established that the burden 
of proof is upon the applicant for a water market transfer to 
demonstrate that "...the (proposed transfer) is either in the 
local public interest or that there are factors that overweigh 
the local public interest in favor of the (transfer)" (at 450). 
Does Enforcement Become An Issue With Water 
Markets? 
The simple answer here is: yes, it is an issue that requires 
careful consideration. Not only with water markets but in 
instances where water managers attempt to impose regulatory 
limits on water use, non-compliance--and thus the need for 
enforcement mechanisms--can be a non-trivial problem. 
Unfortunately, means for dealing with this problem in many 
Western states have had the effect of reducing the efficiency 
gains sought in market transfers. Thus, in states like New 
Mexico a farmer (e.g.) who sells x-acre feet of water rights 
must retire from irrigation the number of acres that the x-acre 
feet of water could irrigate; thus, even if the fanner is 
presently applying water at the extensive margin (earnings 
from the marginal application of water is very low), he 
cannot use his remaining water rights more efficiently via 
reducing water applications per acre in an amount that would 
total x-acre feet. The rationale for this practice is that it 
simplifies enforcement (at least in principle): for enforcement 
purposes, it is easier to verify reduced irrigated acreage than 
reduced water applications/acre. 
More Limited Uses Of Water Markets? 
Let me conclude my brief discussion of issues related to 
water markets with the following thought. It occurs to me 
that even if one rejects the use of water markets as a general 
means for allocating water resources in a region, there may 
still exist "special" cases where markets might--I emphasize 
might--play a role. It is often the case that the source of a 
large part of contention between states sharing an interstate 
stream arises from the question as to bow water is to be 
allocated during periods of drought. Let us then ask the 
question: could such contention be ameliorated, if not 
eliminated, by something akin to a futures market wherein 
particularly vulnerable entities (such as municipalities and 
industry) could purchase calls on water resources during such 




The goals of sustainable development pose unique 
challenges for natural resource and environmental planners 
and managers. If these challenges are to be met, policies 
governing the use of resources must emphasize goals related 
to conservation and reuse. In the case of resources shared by 
one or more states, we must hope that considerations related 
to the management of interstate streams will reflect these 
concerns. Whether one's focus is on interstate or intrastate 
streams, however, water managers are faced with the need to 
shape regulations and policies so as to provide water users 
with strong incentives for efficient water use. Among the 
tools available to them for this purpose are tools with the 
character of a "stick" and/or a "carrot." Examples of "stick-
like" tools are seen in policies recently adopted by the City 
of El Paso, Texas. City ordinances now provide for limits 
(and fines for limit violations) on landscape watering, outdoor 
watering, and non-commercial car washing; water uses that 
spray or flow into streets or right-of-ways are prohibited, and 
the repair of any water leaks is required within 5 days. 
Water prices are examples of "carrot-like" tools available to 
the water planner. Again, the City of El Paso provides 
examples of this set of tools. Arguably (DuMars, 1986) as a 
direct response to increasing water scarcity, the City has 
substantially increased water rates over the last three years: 
water and waste water rates to industrial users (using about 
35 a.f./month) increasing from some $575/a.f. in 1992 to 
almost $1,000/a.f. in 1994. The City also introduced a 
plumbing code that requires the use of ultra-low flow fixtures 
for replacements and new construction; introduced a "cash for 
your commode" rebate program which provides a 75% rebate 
(up to $100) for the replacement of existing facilities; and 
introduced a number of water conservation educational 
programs. As a result of these sets of policy changes, per-
capita water use in El Paso has declined by some 20% (El 
Paso Water Utilities/Public Service Board, 1994). 
In many cases, prices can be used as an effective tool for 
providing incentives for efficient water use. Moreover, at 
least under ideal conditions, they will reflect the true scarcity 
of water in a region and can then provide extraordinarily 
valuable information as to "efficient" patterns of intrastate and 
interstate water uses. If prices are to be used for this 
purpose, the planner's problem is how information regarding 
such prices is to be obtained. A reliance on water markets 
offers one means for resolving this problem--all else equal, 
the strength of a water market is in providing clear signals as 
to the scarcity value of the resource. There is an obvious 
trade-off however. The weakness of water markets is in the 
other problems which they may create, a few of which were 
considered above. Hopefully, our discussions today can serve 
the purpose of stimulating considerations relevant for 
assessing this trade-off. 
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